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Abstract
Culture is an abstract phenomenon that influences its environment.
According to culture theorist Edgar Schein, “culture is an abstraction,
yet the forces that are created in social and organizational situations that
derive from culture are powerful. If we don’t understand the operation of
these forces, we become victim to them.” As a subset of culture, the
strategic culture of the United States requires study so we can
understand its influences on innovation and adaptation in the U.S. Army,
and try to manage those that adversely affect the insititution’s ongoing
transformation. Using the American Interwar era (1919-1941) as a
case—based on some similarities to the contemporary period—this article
focuses on the adverse influences of America’s strategic culture on
innovation and adaptation in the U.S. Army to provide insight to Army
leaders addressing similar (recurring) cultural hindrances to
transformation. As the Army transforms amidst conflict and budget
reductions, it is important to examine and mitigate the negative
influences of the broader strategic culture on its ability to innovate and
adapt.
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Introduction 
Culture is an abstract phenomenon that influences its environment.  
According to culture theorist Edgar Schein, “culture is an abstraction, yet the 
forces that are created in social and organizational situations that derive from 
culture are powerful.  If we don’t understand the operation of these forces, we 
become victim to them.”1  As a subset of culture, the strategic culture of the 
United States requires study so we can understand its influences on 
innovation and adaptation in the U.S. Army, and try to manage those that 
adversely affect the institution’s ongoing transformation.  Using the American 
Interwar era (1919-1941) as a case—based on some similarities to the 
contemporary period—this article focuses on the adverse influences of  
America’s strategic culture on innovation and adaptation in the U.S. Army to 
provide insight to Army leaders addressing similar (recurring) cultural 
hindrances to transformation.  The article does not intend to imply, by its 
focus, that American strategic culture is incompatible with innovation and 
adaptation in the U.S. Army—contrastingly this nation’s strategic culture has 
fielded arguably the world’s most lethal land force—but it continues to exert 
some adverse influences on Army innovation and adaptation that require 
study and mitigation.  This writing will highlight these adverse influences and 
recommend a way to manage them.   
 
The literature on strategic culture reveals various interpretations of what 
comprises the strategic culture of a state.  According to Peter Katzenstein 
strategic culture is a socially constructed identity that shapes national security 
policy and strategic behavior.2 Alastair Johnston explained strategic culture 
as the interaction of a state’s higher level strategic assumptions shaped by 
history; and lower level assumptions about the best strategic options for 
operating in the rules-based international regime.3  Despite various 
interpretations of what constitutes strategic culture, there is a common 
refrain that as a whole it influences state behavior.  This theoretical 
dichotomy holds implications for innovation and adaptation in the U.S Army.   
 
The interwar period is an excellent historical case for studying the influence of 
strategic culture on Army innovation and adaptation because it is similar to 
                                                     
1 Schein, Edgar H, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 3rd edition (San Francisco, 
CA: Jossey Bass, 2004), 4. 
2 Katzenstein, Peter J, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World 
Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 4. 
3 Alastair Iain Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” International Security 4:19 
(1995): 46–48, available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539119. 
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the contemporary period in terms of defense budget and force reductions, 
economic uncertainty, persistent conflict, and the proliferation of emerging 
military technology.  Some scholars have even compared the complexity of the 
contemporary strategic environment to that of the interwar period.  In 2014, 
John Peters and his colleagues wrote that “the adversaries and the missions 
that the Army must be prepared for are more ambiguous and diverse than at 
any time since the period between the World Wars.”4  How American 
strategic culture influenced Army innovation and adaptation at a similar 
juncture in U.S. history can provide valuable insight into managing its effects 
on Army innovation and adaptation today.     
 
Military change or transformation is mainly attained through innovation and 
adaptation.  It occurs when technological innovation (new or existing technology) 
converges with adaptations in the military’s organizational structure, concept of war, 
and vision of future conflict.  Theo Farrell similarly characterizes military change as 
“change in the goals, actual strategies, and/or structure of a military organization.”5  
Though he views military change as a series of paradigmatic shifts through time—
revolutions in the conduct of select aspects of military affairs—Dima Adamsky also 
similarly characterizes military change, describing it as “radical military innovation, 
in which new organizational structures together with novel force deployment 
methods, usually but not always driven by new technologies, change the conduct of 
warfare.”6  
 
Strategic Culture and Army Innovation and Adaptatation in the 
Interwar Period 
Examining a broad, abstract subject as strategic culture requires adoption of 
units of analysis.  Based on the earlier characterization of strategic culture as 
a driver of state behavior, this article adopts the following units of analysis to 
evaluate the influence of American strategic culture on U.S. Army innovation 
and adaptation in the interwar era: 
 
                                                     
4 Peters, John et al., A Methodology For Developing Army Acquisition Strategies For An 
Uncertain Future (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014), 2, available at: 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG532.su
m.pdf. 
5 Theo Farrell, “Innovation in Military Organizations Without Enemies,” International 
Studies Association Annual Convention, April 16–20, 1996, in Theo Farrell and Terry 
Terriff (eds.), The Sources of Military Change: Culture Politics and Technology (Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 5. 
6 Adamsky, Dima, The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors 
on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the U.S. and Israel (Redwood, CA: 
Stanford University Press 2010), 1. 
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 U.S. Congress and its role in defense legislation and oversight;  
 U.S. Presidency and the preference for force and diplomacy; and the 
 American Way of War 
  
These units of analysis are adopted based on the theory that shared 
institutions and traditions and a mutual way of seeing things are aspects of 
culture.  The cultural theorist Edgar Schein lists encompassing customs and 
rituals, and common paradigms of thought and shared meanings among the 
approaches to defining or describing culture.7  The latter applies to culture at 
the strategic level.  In other words, there are traditions, common paradigms of 
thought and shared meanings in the institutions that authorize (legally 
mandate), fund and employ America’s Army in support of its strategic goals. 
 
The U.S. Congress and its Role in Defense Legislation and 
Oversight 
The United States Congress has constitutional control of the national purse.  
The nation’s elected legislators can shape policies supportive or obstructive of 
Army innovation and adaptation by affording or withholding the monetary 
resources vital to research, development, experimentation, procurement and 
doctrinal reorganization.  
 
During the interwar period, Congress hindered conditions supportive of 
innovation and adaptation in the U.S. Army.  Arguably influenced in part by 
an anachronistic, 18th century tradition of post-war force and spending 
reductions, Congress adopted a parsimonious approach to national security 
that drastically reduced Army forces as well as War Department funding for 
research and procurement post World War I.  According to Allan R. Millett 
and his co-authors, Congress believed the nation did not need a large active 
duty post-war force, thus it denied the Army’s request for 500,000 active duty 
troops, and opted for an active force of 280,000 in the 1920 National Defense 
Act.8 Congress chose not to fund the 500,000-man Army proposed by then 
Army Chief of Staff General Peyton March in the Baker-March bill. Congress 
did not see the need for a large standing army after World War I, despite the 
strategic commitments of the day, or the mobilization lessons of that conflict. 
David Johnson concurs that interwar  
 
                                                     
7 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 12-13. 
8 Millett, Allan R., Peter Maslowski and William B. Feis, For the Common Defense: A 
Military History of the United States of America (New York: Free Press, 2012), 344. 
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“Congressional attitudes reflected two fundamental American 
traditions:  distrust of large standing armies and an unswerving belief 
in the preeminence of the citizen soldier.  The U.S. National Army had 
mobilized when it was needed and demobilized when the emergency 
had passed—just as it always had.”9 
 
The Congressionally mandated force and budget reductions of the interwar 
period denied resources vital for research and experimentation with doctrine, 
organization and technology—critical components of Army innovation and 
adaptation.  Millet and his colleagues wrote that congressionally mandated 
spending cuts further “limited the Army to developing weapons prototypes:  it 
did not have enough money to reequip its field forces to contemporary 
European standards.”10  Defense spending cuts during the early interwar 
period denied critical funding for materiel development and procurement for 
the Army.  According to the Richard Stewart and the Center of Military 
History, the 1920 National Defense Act (signed by President Warren G. 
Harding) gave the War Department around roughly “$300 million per year. 
This was about half the estimated cost of fully implementing the force 
structure authorized in the National Defense Act.”11  Additionally, Millet and 
his co-authors wrote that  
 
“…from 1925 until 1940 the War Department spent about $6.2 billion.  
Of this sum, $854 million (roughly two years’ appropriations) went to 
weapons procurement and research and development; the ground 
forces received only $344 million of these appropriations, or an annual 
average of $21 million for new procurement.”12   
 
Richard Stewart and the Center of Military History help to illustrate the 
consequence of the decreasing Army budget; they wrote that for much of the 
interwar period (until the mid to late 1930s), “Army arsenals and laboratories 
were consequently handicapped by small budgets.  Little new equipment was 
forthcoming for ground units until Army appropriations began to rise in 
1936.”13  
                                                     
9 Johnson, David E., Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917–
1945 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 55. 
10 Millett, Maslowski and Feis, For the Common Defense, 358. 
11 Stewart, Richard W. and U.S. Army Center for Military History, American Military 
History, Volume II: The United States Army in a Global Era, 1917–2008 (Washington, 
D.C.: Center of Military History, 2010), 61. 
12 Millet, Maslowski and Feis, For the Common Defense, 358. 
13 Stewart and Center of Military History, American Military History, 61. 
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Congress did foster some innovation and adaptation in the Army to mitigate 
the force reduction and the lack of modern equipment to replace obsolete 
World War I gear.  Amidst the defense budget cuts of the era, Congress passed 
the Air Corps Act in 1926, which improved the Army’s air capability.  This 
legislation also set the Air Corps as a separate branch within the Army, and 
authorized a 1,800 airplane modernization plan.14  
 
The U.S. Presidency and the Preference for Force and 
Diplomacy 
A President’s operational code refers to his or her preference for the 
employment of the military and diplomacy.  This shapes the level of resources 
he or she is willing to invest in the Army and the other services—something 
that is vital to innovation and adaptation.  Steven Hook argues that a 
president’s preference for force or diplomacy is based on his “operational 
code”—a confluence of “principled beliefs regarding the virtues and 
limitations of human nature, the proper roles of government 
and…national…and global problems,” as well as “causal beliefs about the best 
means available for solving these problems.”15  In other words, Presidents 
assume office with their own distinct personalities, preferences and world 
views, which shape their perceptions and their decisions about considerations 
of policy inputs regarding the use of force and diplomacy in international 
affairs.  
 
A brief look at defense policy during the interwar era Presidencies of 
Woodrow Wilson from 1913 to 1921, Calvin Coolidge from 1923 to 1929, 
Herbert Hoover from 1929 to 1933, and Franklin D. Roosevelt from 1933 to 
1945 highlights how Presidential preference for the use of force and 
diplomacy influenced two key prerequisites for Army innovation and 
adaptation—funding and manning. 
 
President Woodrow Wilson was averse to the use of force even when it was 
supported by public opinion and instrumental to furthering his views on 
international norms and influencing the strategic behavior of foreign 
governments.  He strongly preferred diplomacy to force as the means of 
realizing U.S. foreign policy objectives.  According to Arthur Walworth, 
during the crisis with Mexico involving the military junta of General Huerta 
                                                     
14 Millett, Maslowski and Feis, For the Common Defense, 349. 
15 Hook, Steven W., U.S. Foreign Policy: The Paradox of World Power, 4th edition (Los 
Angeles, CA: Sage, 2014), 93. 
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“Wilson reluctantly reached the conclusion that force must be used to 
dislodge Huerta, but he hoped that it would not have to be the force of the 
United States.” 16  To this end, Walworth wrote, Wilson lifted an existing U.S. 
arms embargo on Mexico that permitted the flow of arms to Venustiano 
Carranza, who was fighting against Huerta.17  Writing on Woodrow Wilson’s 
outlook on war and diplomacy, Walworth stated that the President  
 
“…gave consideration to both disarmament and arbitration as means 
to peace.  Though he said little or nothing in public about 
disarmament, he talked with Sir William Tyrrell of the necessity of 
curbing armaments.”18  
 
It follows, given Wilson’s preference for diplomacy, that the Army was small, 
and unprepared in terms of equipment at the start of World War I.  Dwight D. 
Eisenhower wrote that the interwar Army under Wilson’s administration was 
modest in size; “its total strength in the spring of 1915 was approximately 
120,000.”19  Writing about war mobilization on America’s entry into World 
War I in 1917, Eisenhower stated “as usual, our country was sadly—close to 
totally—unprepared.  While we had mobilized a few more regular regiments 
in 1916, the strength of the Regular Army was awfully small.  Intensive efforts 
had to start at once to bring our strength up.”20  Walworth adds that “there 
was no Army to send. German military experts ranked the force of the United 
States on a level with those of tiny nations.”21 
 
President Calvin Coolidge’s (1923-1929) operational code indicated a strong 
preference for diplomacy over force thus he continued Army downsizing with 
limited (treaty enforced) naval armament.  According to David Johnson, 
“Coolidge’s avowed domestic program was to reduce government 
expenditures and enable a tax reduction, and his foreign policy focused on 
international disarmament. War Department pleas for a larger Army were 
contrary to both programs.”22  Coolidge continued the reduction of Army 
ground forces pursued by the Harding administration, but grew the U.S. Navy 
                                                     
16 Walworth, Arthur, Woodrow Wilson, 2nd edition (Boston MA:  Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1965), 369. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid., 378. 
19 Eisenhower, Dwight D., At Ease: Stories I Tell to Friends (New York:  Doubleday & 
Company Inc, 1967), 33. 
20 Ibid., 127. 
21 Walworth, Woodrow Wilson, 101. 
22 Johnson, Fast Tanks, 68. 
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to meet the nation’s strategic maritime interests.  He also expanded American 
airpower.  President Coolidge was averse to maintaining the peacetime 
ground forces deemed necessary by the Army’s leadership to meet the 
nation’s strategic obligations and war readiness.  Thus, budget cuts during 
Coolidge’s administration would reduce the army to about 130,000.23 
Johnson adds that in a speech delivered in 1925, President Coolidge 
expressed doubts as to whether the post-World War I strategic environment 
warranted the budget requirements of the War Department, and stated that 
“the turning of such resources into the making of good roads, the building of 
better homes, the promotion of education and all the others [sic] arts of peace 
which ministry to the advancement of human welfare.”24 
 
The Coolidge administration did make some investments in the Army with 
regard to emerging airplane technology.  According to Millett and his co-
authors, in 1926 Coolidge signed the Air Corps Act into law, “which… 
provided for a force of 1,514 officers, 16,000 men and 1,800 planes, which 
would be modernized by a five-year expansion and modernization 
program.”25 
 
President Herbert Hoover (1929 to 1933) seemed to prefer diplomacy to force 
as a way to preserve U.S. strategic interests.  Consistent with this outlook, 
Herbert Hoover cut back on the naval shipbuilding plans of the Coolidge 
administration, and maintained the peacetime trend of reduced Army 
budgets.  According to Millett and his co-authors, in addition to agreeing to 
further limits to naval shipbuilding at the 1930 London Conference with 
Britain and Japan, the Hoover administration opposed the 1929 shipbuilding 
program. Millett and his co-authors added that under Hoover,  
 
“…the United States agreed to cut its heavy-cruiser program to 
eighteen ships within an 180,000-ton ceiling…and funding for 
manning the fleet, operations, maintenance, and modernization 
dropped about 20 percent below the funds actually authorized in 
1922.”26 
 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administration (1933 to 1945) sought to 
reverse the disarmament and military resource deprivation of the Hoover 
                                                     
23 Millett, Maslowski and Feis, For the Common Defense, 355. 
24 Johnson, Fast Tanks, 68. 
25 Millett, Maslowski and Feis, For the Common Defense, 349. 
26 Ibid., 351. 
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administration.  This was consistent with events in the global strategic 
environment (including the ascendance to power of Adolf Hitler in 1933 and 
German rearmament).  Millett and his co-authors note that “after more than a 
decade of limiting its armed forces through international agreement and 
unilateral fiscal action, the United States in 1933 began to rearm.”  An early 
example was Roosevelt’s 1933 public works allocation of $238 million for 
building “two carriers, four cruisers and twenty destroyers” over three 
years.27 Johnson observes that Roosevelt also wanted to greatly expand 
American airpower, and that he pursued a 6,000 airplane development plan 
by 1939 on the recommendation of the War Department.28 
 
The interwar era Presidents discussed above generally seemed to prefer 
diplomacy to the military instrument of U.S. national power.  Thus, with the 
exception of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was compelled to rearm by 
growing conventional threats in Europe and Asia, the executives during this 
period reduced Army ground forces and funding. 
 
The American Way of War 
How America perceives, prepares, fights and ends wars is part of its strategic 
culture and can be called the American Way of War.  According to Meilinger, 
the American approach to war is characterized by a peacetime preference for 
small, standing armies that can be rapidly mobilized, enlarged with reserve 
and National Guard forces, fight quick and decisive battles, and demobilize at 
war’s end.29  This approach impacts and shapes factors critical to Army 
innovation and adaptation—funding, manning, organization, doctrine, and 
experimentation.  Phillip Meilinger wrote that America’s “approach to war 
has developed in its own distinctive way.”30 
 
In a sense, the American Way of War is a cultural approach that justifies 
drastic post-war force and funding reductions for the U.S. Army, which 
hinders innovation and adaptation.  America’s primarily Anglo-Saxon 
heritage causes most Americans to adopt a linear, inductive mode of 
reasoning that underpins the national cognitive approach towards war and 
military readiness.  According to John Mole,  
 
                                                     
27 Millet, Maslowski and Feis, For the Common Defense, 363–364. 
28 Johnson, Fast Tanks, 65. 
29 Phillip S. Meilinger, “American Military Culture and Strategy,” Joint Force Quarterly 
46 (2007): 80.   
30 Meilinger, “American Military Culture and Strategy,” 80. 
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“…since the renaissance Europe has been divided between the 
pragmatic, empirical, inductive thinking of Anglo-Saxon and North 
Sea cultures and the rationalist, deductive thinking of the rest of the 
continent.  Anglo Saxons are uncomfortable with theories and 
generalizations and concepts.  They prefer to deal with data.”31  
 
This means that for the most part Americans think inductively—they develop 
general laws from facts and empirical data, going linearly from cause to effect.  
This helps explain the practice of reducing forces and funding vital to Army 
innovation and adaptation in periods between wars despite persistent global 
conflict and threats to the United States.   
 
Writing on the influence of society on the military during the course of U.S. 
history, Millett and his co-authors assert that Americans’ “fear of large 
standing forces” has been one of the factors that have “at various times 
imposed severe limitations on the availability of monetary and manpower 
resources.”32  Article I of the U.S. Constitution encourages this ad hoc and 
socially reinforced congressional approach to Army readiness by stipulating 
that “Congress shall have the power…to raise and support Armies, but no 
Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two 
Years.”33  The implication here is that Congress is expected to constantly 
reevaluate the need for an Army and expand and reduce it accordingly. In 
other words, the U.S. Constitution reinforces and perpetuates the national 
perception that the Army is to be drastically retrograded between wars, and 
frantically upgraded to fight and win them—a great concept for an 18th 
century developing nation, but a serious problem for a superpower in an era 
of persistent conflict.  
 
The American Way of War induced and rationalized defense sequestration 
that seriously hindered Army innovation and adaptation in the interwar era.  
According to Millett and his co-authors 
 
“…from 1925 to 1940 the War Department spent about … $854 million 
on weapons procurement and research and development; the ground 
                                                     
31 John Mole, “The Geography of Thinking,” Clinical Medicine 2 4(2002): 343. 
32 Millett, Maslowski and Feis, For the Common Defense, xiv. 
33 The Charters of Freedom, Constitution of the United States, available at: 
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_transcript.html. 
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forces received only $344 million of these appropriations, or an annual 
average of $21 million for new procurement.”34  
 
This amount of funding—though helpful for research and development of new 
equipment like the M1 Garand rifle, the 105 mm howitzer, and the 60 and 81 
mm mortars—was insufficient for refitting the interwar Army to keep pace 
with European armies.35 As previously mentioned Congress chose not to fund 
the 500,000-man Army proposed by Army Chief of Staff General Peyton 
March in the Baker-March bill. Consistent with the long-established 
American Way of War, Congress did not see the need for a large standing 
army after World War I, regardless of the strategic commitments of the day or 
mobilization lessons of that conflict.  
 
Some Insights for Today’s Army Leaders  
Analysis of the influence of strategic culture on Army innovation and 
adaptation in the interwar period provides useful insight for today’s Army 
leaders facing recurring strategic cultural challenges to transformation.  
Congressionally-mandated force and spending reductions beset today’s Army 
much like they did in the interwar period.  Congressional parsimony to the 
Army during the interwar period could be partially explained by a lack of 
persuasiveness of strategic net assessments, which were made by the War 
Department’s Joint Army-Navy Board.  The latter was also responsible for 
developing war plans.  A close link should exist between strategic net 
assessments of potential adversarial state and non-state entities, and military 
capability development.  Allan Millett concurs that “the history of the 
interwar period does demonstrate a relationship between strategic net 
assessment and changes in military capability.”36 
 
Net assessments can partially explain the level of resources (supportive of 
innovation and adaptation) made available or withheld from the Army during 
the interwar period.  Thus, the relatively low level of resource investment in 
Army ground forces during the interwar period can be attributed to what 
David Kahn assessed as a general lack of consideration of the developing 
defense capabilities of potential adversaries. Kahn wrote that  
 
                                                     
34 Millett, Maslowski and Feis, For the Common Defense, 358. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Allan R. Millett, “Patterns of Military Innovation in the Interwar Period,” in 
Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett (eds.), Military Innovation in the Interwar 
Period (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 336. 
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“in designing and procuring military forces…matters as whether 
Germany had 100 divisions or 300 and whether Japan had 10 carriers 
or 20 were not even raised when policy-makers examined the basic 
issues of strategy.”37   
 
Consequently, Congressionally-mandated force and budget reductions 
reduced the force capabilities required to defend U.S. interests in the Pacific 
based on War Plan Orange.  According to Calvin Christman, War Plan Orange 
was the Joint Army-Navy Board’s plan for fighting Japan and it called for the 
Army’s defense against an initial Japanese attack on the Philippines while the 
Navy fought and destroyed the Japanese Navy enroute to relieve the Army.38 
Christman wrote that for a successful naval maneuver to the Philippines, War 
Plan Orange required “advanced bases in the mandated islands…to be seized, 
and neither the army nor the Marines had the necessary troops to seize 
them.”39 
 
It is disconcerting that not only did the Army lack the troop levels needed to 
execute War Plan Orange, it also lacked the amphibious capability essential to 
maneuver in the Asia-Pacific, which arguably boasts the Earth’s largest 
concentration of non-contiguous land mass (lots of islands).  Leo Daugherty 
wrote that the Army would not designate amphibious forces until 1939 when 
it tasked the 3rd Infantry Division to conduct training for amphibious 
operations.  Daugherty cited “the lack of money and public support for the 
military” as factors responsible for the lack of training and readiness.40 
Today’s Army finds itself in a similar predicament vis-a-vis the strategic pivot 
to the Asia-Pacific.   
 
Strategic Net Assessments showing the Army’s sequestration-induced 
unpreparedness to execute War Plan Orange failed to convince U.S. policy 
makers to invest the resources needed to bring Army ground forces to the 
level adequate to attain national strategic goals in the Pacific.  The Army’s 
ability to defend U.S. interests in the Philippines and Hawaii against an 
                                                     
37 David Kahn, “The United States views Germany and Japan in 1941,” in Ernest R. May 
(ed.) Knowing One’s Enemies: Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars 
(Princeton NJ:  Princeton University Press, 1984), 478. 
38 Calvin Christman, “Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Craft of Strategic Assessment,” in 
Williamson Murray and Allan Reed Millett (eds.) Calculations: Net Assessment and the 
Coming of World War II, (New York: Free Press, 1992),” 238–239. 
39 Christman, “Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Craft of Strategic Assessment,” 240. 
40 Daugherty III, Leo J., Pioneers of Amphibious Warfare 1898–1945: Profiles of 
Fourteen American Military Strategists (Jefferson, NC:  MacFarland and Company, 
2009), 336. 
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increasingly belligerent Japan under War Plan Orange was degraded by 
sustained defense sequestration during the interwar period.  Brian Linn wrote 
that after the 1920 Defense Act “the Regular forces in the Pacific never 
approached the peacetime strength envisioned by General Peyton March. In 
1921 the Philippines had a garrison of 13,251 and Hawaii one of 15,368; three 
years later their forces totaled 11,808 and 13,096 respectively.”41 
 
The American Way of War is an anachronistic 18th century approach to war 
that is harmful to Army innovation and adaptation in the current era of 
persistent conflict.  This cognitive approach causes most Americans today—
like their 18th century countrymen—to object to having a large standing 
professional military, and reinforces the assumption that the nation can raise 
a lethal army of fresh young recruits and conscripts on relatively short notice. 
America’s global dominance (in contrast to its 18th century struggle for 
international survival), coupled with the highly technical and complex nature 
of military operations in the 21st century, requires a professional, active army 
adequately funded and sized to attain its strategic goals.  Hastily trained 
masses of recruits and possibly conscripts post authorization of force, or 
declaration of war could prove a very poor substitute for a larger force of 
trained professionals, immersed in the highly technical and equally complex 
human dimensions of 21st century warfare.  The tradition of raising an Army 
when needed while practical to the United States in its infancy, and apt for 
18th century geopolitics, undermines and hinders attainment of the highly 
matured, complex strategic objectives of the world’s only superpower.   
 
Army leaders today actively sensitize the American people, their 
representatives in Congress, and the President to the sequestration induced 
disparity between Army forces, funding and the strategic objectives of the 
nation.  From observation, one could argue that they are doing better than 
their interwar era counterparts who similarly fought to preserve force and 
funding levels adequate to innovate, adapt and defend U.S. interests abroad.  
General Raymond Odierno, the former U.S. Army Chief of Staff, stated that:  
 
“Today we have Soldiers deployed on every continent except 
Antarctica. We have Soldiers doing important missions in the 
security environment around the world. Frankly it is probably 
increasing in instability, which is requiring Army Forces to 
deploy to different places simultaneously. We are doing this 
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while we continue to downsize the Army and take risks in 
modernization and readiness, and frankly I am starting to 
worry about our end strength.”42 
  
Sensitization appears to be the most pragmatic and effective alternative 
available to the Army’s leaders to reduce the adverse effects of America’s 
strategic culture on Army innovation and adaptation.  Relentless sensitization 
will do well to continuously highlight the harmful effects of an anachronistic 
national strategic culture that seems to view the military requirements of a 
highly evolved superpower, through 18th century lens tinted with that era’s 
national and geopolitical concerns. 
 
Conclusion   
America’s strategic culture shapes the ebb and flow of the resources necessary 
for innovation and adaptation in the U.S. Army.  Defense spending and 
legislation, the national cognitive approach to war, and the operational code 
of American Presidents traditionally combine to promote resources for 
innovation and adaptation at the onset and duration of a conflict, and then 
drastically reduce such resources post-war.  This is problematic in the 
contemporary period of persistent conflict.  Army leaders today should 
continue, and where possible redouble their efforts to mitigate this ebb and 
flow effect of U.S. strategic culture on Army innovation and adaptation. 
 
Future research could focus on how culture at the organizational level (within 
the U.S. Army) influenced innovation and adaptation during the interwar 
period.  Such a study could provide insight and help curb recurring interwar 
era Army practices that hinder the Army’s current transformation efforts.  
Moreover, this research could contribute to historical dialogue on the role of 
Army organizational challenges to modernization vis-a-vis the defense 
policies of the White House, and Congressional oversight.    
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